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I.

INTRODUCTION
Ninety-seven percent of federal criminal prosecutions and ninetyfour percent of state criminal prosecutions do not go to trial; instead, they
are resolved by way of guilty pleas.1 Thus, no one can deny the centrality
of plea bargaining in our contemporary criminal justice system. 2
Recognizing this reality, the Supreme Court recently decided two cases
on the same day: Lafler v. Cooper3 and Missouri v. Frye.4 By a 5–4
decision led by Justice Kennedy in both cases, the Supreme Court held
that the Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel extends
to negotiations by defense counsel during the plea bargaining process. 5
In so holding, the Supreme Court acknowledged that plea bargaining is
“not some adjunct to the criminal justice system; it is the criminal justice
system.”6
Specifically, the Court held that a criminal defendant who goes to
trial, rather than accept a favorable plea offer, is entitled to postconviction relief if her refusal or failure to accept the plea offer “was the
result of ineffective assistance during the plea negotiation process.” 7
Lafler and Frye address two different plea bargaining situations that may
give rise to a post-conviction ineffective assistance of counsel claim: (1)
where the defense counsel provides constitutionally deficient legal advice
1

See Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012).
See Brady v. United States, 397 U.S. 742, 751 (1970) (insisting that plea bargaining is
“inherent in the criminal law and its administration”); Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257,
261 (1971) (stating that “[d]isposition of charges after plea discussions is not only an essential
part of the [criminal] process but a highly desirable part for many reasons”).
3 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1388 (2012) (“The reality that criminal justice today is for the most
part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.”) (citations omitted).
4 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (“In today’s criminal justice system, therefore, the negotiation
of a plea bargain, rather than the unfolding of a trial, is almost always the critical point for a
defendant.”).
5 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1384 (“Defendants have a Sixth Amendment right to counsel, a
right that extends to the plea-bargaining process.”); Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407. See generally,
U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses against
him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence [sic].”).
6
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407 (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining
as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)) (emphasis in original).
7 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1386.
2
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based on which the defendant decides not to accept a plea offer, and (2)
where the defense counsel neglects to inform the defendant of a plea
offer, which then lapses.8 Such claims are now evaluated under the
standard set forth in Strickland v. Washington,9 which requires the
defendant to show, first, that the defense counsel made errors falling
below the constitutional standard of effective counsel, and second, that
those errors prejudiced the defendant’s case so as to deprive her of a fair
result.10
Despite its delay, recognition of a right to effective assistance during
plea bargaining, in a system that relies heavily on plea offers, is a victory
in its own right.11 The extent to which the Court recognizes this right,
however, is not entirely clear.12 To better understand this lack of clarity,
it is helpful to first understand how the plea bargaining process works. In
general, plea bargaining is a “negotiated agreement” by which a
defendant agrees to plead guilty in exchange for the prosecutor’s offer of
a more lenient sentence or dismissal of other charges. 13 It is a process
dictated by personal style, rather than hard-and-fast rules.14 Moreover,
plea bargaining is a process that takes place largely “off the record.” 15
Contrasting these “informal” plea offers are “formal,” record-creating
plea offers that some states require to be made in writing.16
The reach of the Court’s holding in Lafler and Frye is uncertain
because the phrase “formal offer” is sporadically used in Frye, even in its
holding, while it is not at all present in Lafler.17 Consequently, it is
unclear, under Lafler and Frye, whether an informal plea offer may form
8

Id. at 1383; Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1404.
466 U.S. 668 (1984).
10 Id. at 687.
11 See Stephanos Bibas, Incompetent Plea Bargaining and Extrajudicial Reforms, 126
HARV. L. REV. 150, 151 (2012) (“The Court, like Rip Van Winkle, has at last awoken from
its long slumber and sees the vast field it has left all but unregulated.”) (footnote omitted).
12 See infra Part III.A (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
13 See infra note 97 and accompanying text (defining “plea bargaining”).
14 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408 (2012) (citing Premo v. Moore, 131 S. Ct. 733,
741 (2011)).
15 Bibas, supra note 11, at 150.
16 See infra note 129 (listing states that require plea offers to be in writing).
17 Compare Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408–10 (using the words “formal offer” six different
times, including one reference made by Scalia, J., dissenting) with Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S.
Ct. 1376 (2012) (never using the words “formal offer”).
9
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the basis of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, or whether, in
order to assert a claim, the defendant must have received a written plea
offer, implying that it was “formally” offered by the prosecution.18 This
confusion presents an important issue because most states do not require
a plea offer to be in writing.19 Where there is no record of ongoing plea
discussions, the defendant is faced with the difficult, if not impossible,
task of proving the prejudice prong of Strickland if she receives
constitutionally deficient advice—that is, but for her counsel’s ineffective
assistance of counsel, the defendant would have accepted the guilty plea. 20
This Note argues that after Lafler and Frye, it is still difficult for a
defendant to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel based
on a plea offer that was not accepted because of: (1) lack of clarity on the
reach of the Lafler and Frye holdings, and (2) lack of formal requirements
regulating the plea bargaining process. Again, the prejudice prong of
Strickland requires the defendant to show that she would have accepted
the plea offer absent defense counsel’s erroneous legal advice.21 Courts
disagree about whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye should be limited
to “formal” plea offers or should extend to all plea offers.22 This Note
argues that the better approach—or at least the one affording greater
constitutional protection to defendants—is extending the Lafler and Frye
holdings to all plea offers, rather than limiting the holdings to formal
offers.23 Such an interpretation recognizes the reality that extensive
negotiations often occur between the defense counsel and prosecution,
usually without the defendant present, before any plea offer is committed
18

See infra Part III.A (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
19 See infra note 129 (enumerating states that require a plea bargain to be in writing).
20 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence
that their attorneys did not tell them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice. Given the
difficulty of proving such claims and satisfying both of Strickland’s prongs, few Strickland
claims of any sort succeed, let alone fabricated ones.”) (footnote omitted); see also Jenny
Roberts, Effective Plea Bargaining Counsel, 122 YALE L.J. 2650, 2671 (2013) (“[O]bstacles
have made relief from ineffective assistance generally inaccessible to individual litigants, and
Strickland and its progeny are deserving of the well-developed body of scholarly critique
about the hurdles the doctrine has constructed.”).
21 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
22 See infra Part III (discussing cases both denying and accepting claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel where defendant did not receive a “formal” plea offer).
23 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 2672 (discussing the Court’s intent in Frye when using
“formal” plea offer language).
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to writing.24 Moreover, this approach does not penalize the defendant for
relying on a plea offer that the defense counsel and prosecution failed to
put into writing.
Additional difficulties arise for defendants when attempting to
satisfy the second requirement under the prejudice prong of Strickland,
which requires a defendant to show that if she accepted the plea offer,
there is a reasonable probability that the prosecution and the court would
have accepted the offer to plead guilty. 25 The prosecution and courts
generally hold broad, unregulated discretion to reject a plea bargain after
the defendant accepts it, and there is no clear standard regulating the
practice of courts and prosecutors in such circumstances.26 This means
that, regardless of whether the defendant would have accepted the plea
offer, a court can easily deny the defendant’s ineffective assistance of
counsel claim on the sometimes baseless ground that neither the trial
court nor the prosecution would have accepted the plea offer. 27 In order
to safeguard the right afforded to defendants under Lafler and Frye, the
plea bargaining process should be formalized; in addition to requiring
written plea offers, there should be standardized procedures to guide how
the prosecution and courts may reject plea offers.
Part II of this Note provides background on the Supreme Court’s
development of a standard for ineffective assistance of counsel claims
during the plea bargaining process, and how that standard has changed
after the most recent decisions of Lafler and Frye. Part III emphasizes
the trial court splits as to whether the holdings in Lafler and Frye apply
to all plea offers, or only to those plea offers that are considered “formal.”
Part III further analyzes the plea bargaining process and the reasons why
informality in the process places defendants at a distinct disadvantage
when bringing claims for ineffective assistance of counsel. Part IV
examines states’ statutes and court rules, as well as the American Bar
24 See id. at 2671 (“A more powerful critique of regulating the plea bargaining process is
that because bargaining happens off the record between prosecution and defense—and
normally outside the defendant’s presence—it is difficult to adequately examine any later
claim of ineffectiveness in that process.”).
25 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012) (“Defendants must also demonstrate a
reasonable probability the plea would have been entered without the prosecution canceling it
or the trial court refusing to accept it, if they had the authority to exercise that discretion under
state law.”).
26 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162.
27 See id. at 162.
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Association (“ABA”) Criminal Justice Standards, the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct (“Model Rules”), and the Federal Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to determine where formal processes are already in place and
where they ought to be for the future. Finally, Part V makes specific
recommendations to formalize the plea bargaining process, and considers
the implications of carrying out these recommendations for the duties of
the defense counsel and prosecution.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Standard under Hill v. Lockhart and Padilla v. Kentucky
Prior to Lafler and Frye, the Supreme Court addressed the right to
effective assistance of counsel during the plea bargaining process in two
decisions: Hill v. Lockhart28 and Padilla v. Kentucky.29 In Hill, the Court
held that the correct standard for courts assessing ineffective assistance
of counsel claims in the plea bargaining context is the two-prong test set
forth in Strickland.30 Before Hill, the Court focused instead on whether
the defense counsel’s advice caused the defendant to enter a plea
involuntarily or unintelligently.31 Now, under the Strickland standard, in
order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, the
defendant must satisfy two prongs:
[f]irst, the defendant must show that counsel’s performance was deficient. This
requires showing that counsel made errors so serious that counsel was not
functioning as the ‘counsel’ guaranteed the defendant by the Sixth Amendment.
Second, the defendant must show that the deficient performance prejudiced the
defense. This requires showing that counsel’s errors were so serious as to deprive
32
the defendant of a fair trial, a trial whose result is reliable.

Hill involved a petitioner who pled guilty to first-degree murder and
theft of property.33 Later, the petitioner brought a habeas petition based
on ineffective assistance of counsel, alleging that his counsel failed to
advise him about his parole eligibility date—specifically, that he would
have to serve half of his sentence before he was eligible for parole.34 The

28

474 U.S. 52 (1985).
130 S. Ct. 1473 (2010).
30 Hill, 474 U.S. at 58.
31 See McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759 (1970); Brady v. United States, 397 U.S.
742 (1970).
32
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).
33 Hill, 474 U.S. at 53.
34 Id.
29
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Court held that the petitioner did not satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong
because he failed to allege in his petition that, had his counsel correctly
advised him, he would have gone to trial instead of accepting the guilty
plea.35 Hill’s holding was limited; the Court stated:
[w]e find it unnecessary to determine whether there may be circumstances under
which erroneous advice by counsel as to parole eligibility may be deemed
constitutionally ineffective assistance of counsel, because in the present case we
conclude that petitioner’s allegations are insufficient to satisfy the Strickland v.
36
Washington requirement of ‘prejudice.’

Thus, Hill left open the question of whether the defense counsel is under
a constitutional duty to negotiate effectively during the plea bargaining
process.37
In Padilla, the defense counsel misinformed the defendant about the
consequences of pleading guilty, and specifically advised him that it
would not result in his deportation; this advice was plainly wrong, and
the defendant faced deportation as a result of his guilty plea.38 While the
Court in Hill was reluctant to determine whether erroneous advice as to
parole eligibility could constitute ineffective assistance of counsel in
other cases, the Court in Padilla found that “advice regarding deportation
is not categorically removed from the ambit of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel.”39 Padilla was concerned with only the first prong of
Strickland—whether defense counsel’s erroneous advice regarding the
guilty plea amounted to performance falling below the reasonableness
standard of effective assistance of counsel—and held that the advice did
fall below the reasonableness standard.40 Despite the fact that the Court
did not reach the prejudice issue, the Padilla majority used strong
language favoring a broadened scope of the Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel.41 Focusing its discussion on the
consequences of bad advice for defendants, the Court emphasized the
long recognition “that the negotiation of a plea bargain is a critical phase
35

Id. at 60.
Id.
37 Wesley MacNeil Oliver, The Indirect Potential of Lafler and Frye, 51 DUQ. L. REV.
633, 634 (2013).
38 Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1478 (2010).
39 Id. at 1476.
40 Id. at 1482.
41 Id. at 1486 (“It is our responsibility under the Constitution to ensure that no criminal
defendant—whether a citizen or not—is left to the ‘mercies of incompetent counsel.’”) (citing
McMann v. Richardson, 397 U.S. 759, 771 (1970)).
36
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of litigation for purposes of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel.”42
Although Padilla expanded defense counsel duties after Hill, the
standard for ineffective assistance of counsel still did not require the
defense counsel to obtain a favorable deal for the defendant. Padilla and
Hill dealt specifically with the situation in which a defendant accepts a
guilty plea and foregoes trial.43 Lafler and Frye involve a significantly
different situation, in that they involve defendants who reject plea offers
and go to trial, alleging that they would have accepted the plea offer if
they had been correctly informed by their counsel.44 The new question
that the Supreme Court in Lafler and Frye faced was whether a defendant
could assert an ineffective assistance of counsel claim if she received a
fair trial. Not only did the Court in Lafler and Frye hold that a defendant
could bring such a claim, but it also required defense counsel to satisfy
the Sixth Amendment by negotiating effectively during the plea
bargaining process.45 Now, errors in the negotiation process may satisfy
the prejudice prong under Strickland and thereby constitute ineffective
assistance of counsel.46
B. The New Standard under Lafler v. Cooper and Missouri v.
Frye
i. The Facts
In Lafler, Anthony Cooper pointed a gun at Kali Mundy’s head,
fired a shot, and missed.47 Mundy fled, and Cooper followed while firing
additional shots.48 Mundy survived with gunshot wounds in her buttocks,
hip, and abdomen.49 Cooper was charged with assault with intent to
murder, possession of a firearm in the commission of a felony,

42

Id. at 1481.
Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52, 368 (1985); Padilla, 130 S. Ct. at 1478.
44 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1406 (2012) (distinguishing the legal issue in Hill
and Padilla from the one presented in Frye).
45 See Oliver supra note 37, at 633 (“The Supreme Court’s two previous forays into this
area recognized the right to the effective assistance of counsel during plea bargaining but did
not recognize the right to an effective negotiator.”).
46 See id. at 636.
47
Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1383 (2012).
48 Id.
49 Id.
43
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misdemeanor possession of marijuana, and being a habitual offender. 50
The prosecution offered, twice, that in exchange for a guilty plea, it would
dismiss two of the charges and recommend a prison sentence of fifty-one
to eighty-five months on the remaining charges.51 Cooper rejected these
offers, allegedly because his defense counsel “convinced him that the
prosecution would be unable to establish his intent to murder Mundy
because she was shot below the waist.”52 Cooper rejected a less favorable
plea at trial, and was convicted on all counts; he was sentenced to a
mandatory minimum jail sentence of 185 to 360 months.53 Cooper
appealed, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, and the state court
of appeals rejected his claim.54 Thereafter, the United States District
Court granted Cooper’s petition for habeas relief, and ordered specific
performance of the original plea offer.55 The Sixth Circuit affirmed,
essentially because Cooper’s longer sentence was due to his counsel’s
ineffective assistance.56
In Frye, Galin Frye faced charges for driving with a revoked driver’s
license.57 He already had three previous convictions, and this fourth
offense constituted a felony punishable by up to four years
imprisonment.58 The prosecutor presented Frye’s defense counsel with
two offers in exchange for Frye’s guilty plea: the first offer was a
recommended three-year sentence if Frye pled guilty to the felony charge;
the second offer would reduce the charge to a misdemeanor, and if Frye
pled guilty to the misdemeanor charge, the prosecution would
recommend a ninety-day sentence and a maximum term of one-year
imprisonment.59 Frye’s defense counsel never advised him of these plea
offers, and both offers eventually expired.60 The court sentenced Frye to
three years in prison after he pled guilty on the eve of trial.61 Frye then
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
61

Id.
Id.
Id.
Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1383.
Id.
Id. at 1383–84.
Id.
Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1404 (2012).
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1404–05.
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sought state post-conviction relief, alleging that he was denied effective
assistance of counsel because his counsel failed to inform him of the
prosecutor’s plea offer to reduce his felony charge to a misdemeanor. 62
Although the trial court denied his motion, the Missouri Court of Appeals
reversed, holding that Frye satisfied the requirements of an ineffective
assistance of counsel claim under Strickland, and remanded the case to
the trial court to either re-try the case or allow Frye to re-plead to accept
the offer.63
ii. The Majority and Dissenting Opinions
Lafler and Frye were argued and decided together. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court in Frye held that “[t]he Sixth Amendment right to
effective assistance of counsel extends to the consideration of plea offers
that lapse or are rejected.”64 Similarly, the majority in Lafler applied the
Sixth Amendment right to the plea bargaining process; it too defined the
scope of the defendant’s remedy resulting from a Strickland violation,
which requires the court to “neutralize the taint” of the constitutional
violation as long as it does not amount to a “windfall” or “needlessly
squander” state resources.65 Reaching this conclusion, the majority in
Lafler disagreed with the government’s argument that “[a] fair trial wipes
clean any deficient performance by defense counsel during plea
bargaining” because that argument “ignores the reality that criminal
justice today is for the most part a system of pleas, not a system of trials.” 66
For this reason, the majorities’ opinions in Lafler and Frye are premised
on the notion that defendants are entitled to accurate advice on proposed
plea agreements, even though there is neither a constitutional right to
receive a plea offer, nor a federal right to have a judge accept the plea
offer.67
Justice Scalia dissented in Lafler and Frye, disagreeing with the
majority on whether constitutional rights should attach to the plea
bargaining process, and focusing most of his dissent on how plea
62

Id.
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1405.
64 Id. at 1402.
65 Lafler v. Cooper, 132 S. Ct. 1376, 1381 (2012) (citations omitted).
66
Id. at 1388.
67 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1410 (finding no constitutional right to be offered a plea and no
federal right for a judge to accept a plea).
63
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bargaining is an embarrassing part of the criminal justice system. 68 In
many respects, Justice Scalia does not respond to the arguments made in
the majority opinions; his argument about how the system ought to be
ignores the reality that guilty plea dispositions in actuality command the
vast majority of state and federal criminal convictions.69 His response to
this reality, much like the government’s argument, is that no injustice has
been committed against the defendant who receives the “exorbitant gold
standard of American justice—a full-dress criminal trial.”70 A “full-dress
criminal trial,” however, cannot be relied upon to protect the
constitutional rights of defendants, where plea bargaining commands the
criminal justice system.
Setting aside his discussion on the efficacy of the plea bargaining
system, Justice Scalia sheds light on important questions that the majority
opinions failed to address.71 In particular, the majority in Frye provides
that in circumstances where the defense counsel causes a plea offer to
lapse or to be rejected, defendants must show, under the prejudice prong
of Strickland, a reasonable probability that: (1) they would have accepted
the plea offer absent ineffective assistance of counsel; (2) the prosecution
would not have rejected the plea offer later if they had discretion to reject
it under state law; and (3) the trial court would not have refused to accept
the plea offer if it had discretion to reject it under state law.72 The majority
opinion essentially avoids the issue of how the defendant would be able
to satisfy the second and third requirements under Frye, asserting:
[i]t can be assumed that in most jurisdictions prosecutors and judges are familiar
with the boundaries of acceptable plea bargains and sentences. So in most
instances it should not be difficult to make an objective assessment as to whether
or not a particular fact or intervening circumstance would suffice, in the normal
course, to cause prosecutorial withdrawal or judicial nonapproval of a plea
73
bargain.

Thus, the majority assumes it is simple for a defendant to prove the
second and third requirements under Frye, and fails to explain the source
68 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“Today . . . the Supreme Court of the
United States elevates plea bargaining from a necessary evil to a constitutional entitlement.
It is no longer a somewhat embarrassing adjunct to our criminal justice system.”).
69 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1407.
70 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1397–98 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[T]he Court today opens a whole
new field of constitutionalized criminal procedure: plea–bargaining law.”).
71
Id. at 1392.
72 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
73 Id. at 1410.
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of this assumption. Responding to the majority’s opinion, Justice Scalia
retorts, “[a]ssuredly it can [be assumed], just as it can be assumed that the
sun rises in the west; but I know of no basis for the assumption.”74
The majority’s statement is less than satisfactory for Justice Scalia,
and more so for defendants, who are likely to encounter difficulties
proving that prosecutors and courts would have accepted the plea offer in
the absence of any standards articulating their practices.75 Justice Scalia
raises questions that demonstrate some of these difficulties:
[i]s it constitutional, for example, for the prosecution to withdraw a plea offer that
has already been accepted? Or to withdraw an offer before the defense has had
adequate time to consider and accept it? Or to make no plea offer at all, even
though its case is weak—thereby excluding the defendant from ‘the criminal
76
justice system’?

These questions indicate the need for procedural guidelines governing
how the prosecution and the court may reject plea offers, and enabling
defendants to prove the second prong of Strickland.
Courts are offered additional guidance under the first prong of
Strickland, which requires courts to look to professional norms of
attorney conduct to determine whether the defense counsel’s performance
meets the standard for effective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment.77 The majority decision in Frye extends this reference to
professional norms to the plea bargaining context, suggesting that courts
look to codified standards when assessing defense counsel’s
performance.78 Specifically, the majority cites ABA standards and state
bar professional standards, as well as state rules and state and federal case
law to define the duties of defense counsel under the Sixth Amendment. 79
Such standards help defendants prove the first prong of Strickland and
guide judges in determining whether the first prong has been met. Similar
standards should be codified setting forth how the prosecution and courts
74

Id. at 1413 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See, e.g., Bibas supra note 11, at 162 (“[D]efendants will find it hard to prove that
prosecutors would have left plea offers on the table and that judges would have accepted
proposed bargains, and thus that defendants would ultimately have benefited from the
proposed bargains.”).
76 Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1392.
77 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. at 688 (1984).
78 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“[T]hough the standard for counsel’s performance is not
determined solely by reference to codified standards of professional practice, these standards
can be important guides.”).
79 Id. at 1408.
75
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may reject plea offers to help defendants prove the second prong of
Strickland, and to help judges reach fair results in these cases.80
III. FORMAL VS. INFORMAL PLEA OFFERS
A. Confusion Over Whether a “Formal Offer” is Required to
Prove Prejudice
According to the Court in Frye, “[d]efense counsel has the duty to
communicate formal offers from the prosecution to accept a plea on terms
and conditions that may be favorable to the accused.” 81 Justice Kennedy
clarified the meaning of “formal offer” as used in Frye, expressing, “the
fact of a formal offer means that its terms and its processing can be
documented so that what took place in the negotiation process becomes
clearer if some later inquiry turns on the conduct of earlier pretrial
negotiations.”82 As previously noted, the Supreme Court uses the word
“formal” in Frye, but not in Lafler.83 This inconsistent use of “formal
offer” between the two decisions suggests that the Court did not intend to
limit its holdings to formal offers.84
In recent cases, however, courts have denied claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel on the basis that no “formal offer” was extended to
the defendant. One court even cited Lafler as authority for requiring the
prosecution to offer a “formal” plea to the defendant, despite the lack of
any “formal offer” language in the Lafler opinion.85 The Eighth Circuit
Court of Appeals adds to the confusion with its decision in Kingsberry v.
United States,86 decided prior to Lafler and Frye, which holds that a
formal offer is required to establish prejudice for an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim. The Kingsberry court stated:
80

See infra Part IV (examining codified requirements of plea bargaining).
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (emphasis added).
82 Id. at 1409.
83 Id. at 1408–10 (using the words “formal offer” seven different times); Lafler v. Cooper,
132 S. Ct. 1276, 1376 (2012) (never using the words “formal offer”).
84 See Roberts, supra note 20, at 2662 (“Surely, if the Court meant to limit the right to
effective assistance to informing and counseling defendants about formal plea offers the
prosecution has extended, it would not have repeatedly used the words ‘plea bargaining,’ ‘plea
negotiations,’ and ‘negotiation of a plea bargain.’”).
85 See DeFilippo v. United States, No. 09-CV-4153 (NGG), 2013 WL 817196, at *6
(E.D.N.Y. Mar. 5, 2013) (citing Lafler, 132 S. Ct. at 1385) (“Thus, the lack of a formal plea
offer strongly weighs against a finding that DeFilippo would have pled guilty.”).
86 202 F.3d 1030 (8th Cir. 2000).
81

SABRINA MIRZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

500

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

11/3/2015 3:51 PM

[Vol. 39:2

[w]e address the prejudice component, assuming arguendo that the performance
of Kingsberry’s trial counsel fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
We begin by noting that prejudice is possible, notwithstanding a subsequent fair
trial, where counsel failed to provide accurate advice regarding a plea agreement
offer. Logic dictates therefore, that to establish such prejudice, the petitioner
must begin by proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the
government. Kingsberry argues that the contradictory affidavits submitted on this
issue create a fact dispute, mandating an evidentiary hearing. We disagree.
The record before this Court is sufficient to show conclusively that a formal plea
offer never materialized. The two parties necessarily privy to a plea offer and
fundamental to resolution of this issue both deny the existence of a plea
agreement offer . . . . No facts casting genuine doubt upon the veracity of [trial
87
counsel’s] affidavit were presented.

In Johnson v. United States,88 the Northern District of Iowa interpreted
Kingsberry as “establish[ing] the requirement of a formal plea offer from
the prosecution to be a bright line test of prejudice arising from counsel’s
deficient performance in plea negotiations.”89 On the basis of this
interpretation, the Johnson court rejected the defendant’s ineffective
assistance of counsel claim because the prosecution did not extend him a
formal offer.90 The Johnson court cited the Sixth Amendment as authority
for denying the defendant’s claim because no formal offer was presented
to the defendant.91
By contrast, in another Northern District of Iowa case, Wanatee v.
Ault,92 the court found that the defendant was offered a formal plea as
required under Kingsberry, even though the offer was not in writing.93
87

Id. at 1032–33 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted).
860 F. Supp. 2d 663 (N.D. Iowa 2012).
89 Id. at 789.
90 Id. at 790 (citing Kingsberry, 202 F.3d at 1032 (“Where no formal offer of a plea
agreement from the prosecution ever materialized, Johnson cannot make the bright line
showing necessary to prove prejudice in plea negotiations.”)).
91 Id. at 782. “The performance of trial counsel in plea negotiations [] was deficient
[because of] their continued push for an agreement to a sentence for a term of years, once a
plea to a term of years became both wholly unrealistic and wholly unreasonable as a
bargaining position.” Id. However, it was not a valid claim for ineffective assistance of
counsel because the prosecution never formally offered the defendant a plea agreement to a
sentence less than death. Id.
92 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202 (N.D. Iowa 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d 700 (8th Cir. 2001).
93 Id. at 1202–03 (“It is undisputed that there was no written offer of a plea agreement
and that no written plea agreement was ever prepared or executed . . . . [T]he initial
requirement of Kingsberry, ‘that to establish . . . prejudice, the petitioner must begin by
proving that a plea agreement was formally offered by the government’ . . . has been satisfied
in Wanatee’s case.”).
88
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Arriving at this conclusion, the court distinguished the facts of Wanatee
from those in Kingsberry. In Kingsberry, the defendant initiated plea
negotiations by proffering information, after which the government did
not make a plea offer because it found the proffer to be inadequate, while
in Wanatee, the defendant proffered information only after the
prosecution extended a plea offer.94 This distinction confuses the issue of
what constitutes a “formal offer” because it is not based on whether or
not the offer was in writing.
More recent cases rely on a combination of Lafler, Frye, and
Kingsberry to dismiss claims of ineffective assistance of counsel for lack
of prejudice when the prosecution did not extend any formal plea offer. 95
Other courts explicitly found that “[t]he absence of a formal plea offer
does not necessarily mean there were no plea negotiations.”96 Thus, the
need to clarify the “formal offer” distinction used in Frye is evident.
B. The Plea Bargaining Process
In order to better understand the distinction between formal and
informal plea offers, as well as the rules and statutes governing plea
bargaining, it is worth exploring a more basic question: what exactly is
the plea bargaining process and how does it work? To begin, Black’s
Law Dictionary defines a “plea bargain” as “[a] negotiated agreement
94

Id. at 1203.
See Williams v. United States, No. 2:08-CR-0112 (GZS), 2013 WL 2155390, at *4 (D.
Me. May 17, 2013) (“When there is no formal offer on the table, this particular duty [for
defense counsel to communicate formal offers, under Frye] does not arise.”); Gilchrist v.
United States, No. 08-1218, 2012 WL 4520469, at *19 (D. Md. Sept. 27, 2012) (“Petitioner
clearly cannot establish the deficient performance prong under Strickland without showing
that a formal plea offer was made.”); Ramos v. United States, No. 01-10369 (PBS), 2012 WL
1109081, at *5 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2012) (“If no plea offer is made, the issue of ineffective
assistance of counsel during plea bargaining would typically not be cognizable . . . [here]
[t]here is no evidence that Ramos instructed his lawyer to negotiate a plea prior to trial, or that
the government made an offer to negotiate, which he rebuffed.”); Silva v. United States, No.
4:12-CV-0898 (DGK), 2013 WL 1628444, at *4 (W.D. Mo. Apr. 16, 2013) (“[T]he movant
must prove that the alleged plea agreement was formally offered by the Government . . . . In
the present case, Silva has failed to demonstrate that the Government ever offered a binding
plea agreement for 63 to 78 months imprisonment . . . .”); Ortiz v. United States, No. 124092, 2013 WL 1339722, at *8 (D. S.D. Feb. 7, 2013) (citations omitted) (“Ortiz has failed
to prove a plea agreement was formally offered. Ortiz does not claim a plea offer was made,
and the Government and Ortiz’s counsel have explicitly denied a plea offer was made.”).
96 Atkinson v. Elwood, No. 01-CIV-5462, 2004 WL 2943665, at *3 (E.D. Pa. Dec. 20,
2004) (citations omitted).
95
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between a prosecutor and a criminal defendant whereby the defendant
pleads guilty to a lesser offense or to one of multiple charges in exchange
for some concession by the prosecutor, [usually] a more lenient sentence
or a dismissal of the other charges.”97
This definition, characterizing a plea bargain as a “negotiated
agreement,” notably describes plea bargaining as a type of negotiation.
Courts look to negotiation texts for guidance in evaluating whether
defense counsel is negotiating effectively during the plea bargaining
process, “stress[ing] preparation as a required component of good
negotiation.”98 Also in line with this definition, courts and legal scholars
have viewed the plea bargaining process as governed by contract
principles.99 Yet, if contract principles are applied to plea bargaining, why
are there no uniform rules as to when offers must be in writing and
whether or not the prosecution and court has discretion to reject a plea
offer once it has been accepted?100
These questions are important to ineffective assistance of counsel
claims after Lafler and Frye because the defendant must demonstrate a
reasonable probability that she would have accepted the plea and that the
prosecution and court would not have rejected it once the plea was
accepted.101 For example, the Seventh Circuit held that the defendant’s
self-serving statement alone was insufficient to establish a reasonable
probability that the defendant would have accepted the plea offer absent
the defense counsel’s ineffective assistance; the court required “objective
evidence” to corroborate the defendant’s self-serving statement.102 The
Eleventh Circuit similarly required a defendant to produce objective

BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1270 (9th ed. 2009).
Rishi Batra, Lafler and Frye: A New Constitutional Standard for Negotiation, 14
CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 309, 325 (2013) (citations omitted).
99 Rebecca Hollander-Blumoff, Getting to “Guilty”: Plea-bargaining as Negotiation, 2
HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 115, 119 (1997); see also Frank Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as
a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 289 (1983) (characterizing the plea agreement as a
bargained-for transaction); Robert E. Scott & William J. Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract,
101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1910 (1992) (“The courts, on the other hand, have proceeded to construct
a body of contract-based law to regulate the plea bargaining process, taking for granted the
efficiency and decency of the process being regulated.”).
100 See discussion infra Part V (proposing that uniform rules on plea bargaining should
be enacted).
101 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1409 (2012).
102 See Toro v. Fairman, 940 F.2d 1065, 1068 (7th Cir. 1991).
97
98
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evidence corroborating his claim that he rejected a plea offer against his
wishes based on advice he received from his defense counsel.103 The
problem with requiring the defendant to present “objective evidence”
corroborating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim is that the plea
bargaining system is often so informal that it does not require defense
counsel or prosecuting attorneys to create any evidence of plea bargaining
whatsoever.
The main reason plea bargaining is informal and largely
unregulated, as the court in Frye recognized, is that plea bargaining is “by
its nature, defined to a substantial degree by personal style.”104 For this
reason, the court consistently hesitates to impinge upon defense counsels’
broad leeway to decide how they wish to negotiate offers with the
prosecuting attorneys.105 As a result, the Court has provided little
guidance on the duties of defense counsel, setting forth only the bare
minimum requirement that defense counsel must communicate “formal
offers” to the defendant.106
This is not to say that no process at all governs plea bargaining. In
fact, much has been written on effective negotiating strategies. 107 PostPadilla, the ABA issued guidance to defense counsel and prosecutors on
their duties to inform defendants of immigration and other consequences
that those defendants may face as a result of accepting or rejecting a guilty
plea.108 Still, the extent to which the right to effective assistance of
counsel regulates plea bargaining is uncertain.109 Other guidelines include
103

Diaz v. United States, 930 F.2d 832, 835 (11th Cir. 1991).
Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408; see also G. NICHOLAS HERMAN, PLEA-BARGAINING § 1.02
(2d ed. 1981) (discussing different plea-bargaining styles).
105 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1408 (“This case presents neither the necessity nor the occasion to
define the duties of defense counsel in those respects, however.”).
106 Id.
107 See, e.g., Dann Orr & Chris Guthrie, Anchoring, Information, Expertise, and
Negotiation: New Insights from Meta-Analysis, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 597 (2006);
see also Rodney J. Uphoff, The Criminal Defense Lawyer as Effective Negotiatior: A Systemic
Approach, 2 CLINICAL L. REV. 73 (1995).
108 Mark Walsh, Task Force Probes Defense Lawyers’ Role After Padilla, A.B.A. J. 60–
61
(Apr.
1,
2011),
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/task_force_probes_defense_lawyers_role_after
_padilla/.
109 See, e.g., Josh Bowers, Lafler, Frye, and the Subtle Art of Winning by Losing, 25 FED.
SENT’G REP. 41 (2012) (“It remains to be seen whether the Court in Lafler similarly has
obliged a defense attorney to push (and how hard?) a defendant to accept a plea bargain (or,
104
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The National Legal Aid and Defender Association’s Performance
Guidelines for Criminal Defense Representation, which requires counsel
to be “completely familiar” with “concessions that the client might offer”
and “benefits the client might obtain.”110 In addition, “[c]ounsel should
attempt to become familiar with the practices and policies of a particular
jurisdiction, judge and prosecuting authority, which may affect the
content and likely results of negotiated plea bargains.” 111 The existence
of such guides demonstrates that defining effective plea bargaining “is
neither unrealistic nor impossible to achieve.”112
Prosecution and defense strategies used during the course of
negotiating plea bargains vary widely. This again makes regulating the
process more difficult. Courts take several factors into account to
determine whether a plea agreement should be reached, and if so, what
the plea agreement should entail.113 The factors both parties evaluate
include the strength of each side’s case, how the jury is likely to lean in a
given location, how evidentiary issues in the case are governed by legal
rules, and the best alternative to a negotiated agreement (“BATNA”) that
is available to each side.114 For defense counsel, such evaluation is a
matter of becoming familiar with “the prosecutor’s personality” and how
“[the] judge’s reactions to specific types of crimes” will likely affect the
outcome of the case.115 On the other hand, the prosecution’s evaluation
comes down to whether the evidence is strong enough against the
defendant to render the case worthwhile to take to trial.116
The literature describing plea bargaining strategies makes clear that
plea bargaining is by and large a process dictated by experience rather
than hard-and-fast rules. As Professors Scott and Stuntz note:
[t]he problem is that one cannot distinguish between good and bad bargaining by
looking at the process by which the lawyers reached their deal. A two-minute
conversation with the prosecutor in the hallway with only slight advance

for that matter, to push a prosecutor to offer one).”).
110 GUIDELINE 6.2: THE CONTENTS OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, NLADA, available at
http://www.nlada.org/Defender/Defender_Standards/Performance_Guidelines#sixone.
111 Id.; see also ANTHONY AMSTERDAM, 1 TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMINAL
CASES §§ 201–19 (5th ed. 1988).
112 Roberts, supra note 20, at 2666.
113 See Hollander-Blumoff, supra note 99, at 121.
114
See id.
115 See id. at 122.
116 See id. at 124.
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preparation may represent evidence of sloppiness and sloth. Or it may be that
defense counsel, who has a great deal of experience in dealing with similar cases,
knows the market price, realizes that investigation is extremely unlikely to lead
anywhere, and understands how to get to the best offer expeditiously. In a context
where bargaining skill depends more on knowledge of information about other
cases than on case-specific preparation, it is hard to judge a defense attorney’s
117
performance by his behavior in any one case.

Thus, evaluation of a counsel’s performance during plea bargaining is
difficult, for example, because less effort expended by the counsel might
be indicative of more experience, rather than laziness. Lafler and Frye
have the potential to encourage further discussion on plea bargaining
strategies where it was previously considered taboo. 118 Mere discussion,
however, is unlikely to bring about the change needed for defendants to
succeed on ineffective assistance of counsel claims arising from plea
bargaining negotiations.
IV. SURVEY OF STATE AND FEDERAL RULES AND STATUTES
A. Standards of Professionally Competent Assistance
Supreme Court cases applying the Strickland standard have looked
to the Model Rules to determine competency under the first prong.119
While the Model Rules do not explicitly address plea bargaining, they
apply to lawyers in their capacities as negotiators.120 Formalizing plea
offers, discussed in Part B of this section, facilitates enforcement of the
ABA Model Rules, specifically Rule 1.6, by ensuring that defendants are
not denied access to evidence of plea negotiations by defense counsel
who invoke the attorney-client privilege and duty of confidentiality. 121
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice directly address plea
bargaining duties of defense counsel when negotiating with the
prosecution.122 Standard 4-4.1(a) provides:

117
118
119
120

See Scott & Stuntz, supra note 99, at 1959.
See Oliver, supra note 37, at 637–40.
See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 524 (2003).
MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT, PREAMBLE: A LAWYER’S RESPONSIBILITIES 2

(2013).
121 Laurence A. Benner, Expanding the Right to Effective Counsel at Plea Bargaining
Opening Pandora’s Box?, 27 ABA CRIM. JUST. 4, 7 (2012) (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L
CONDUCT R. 1.6(a)–(b)(5)).
122 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE: PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE
FUNCTION, Standard 4-6.2 (3d ed. 1993).
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Defense counsel should conduct a prompt investigation of the circumstances of
the case and explore all avenues leading to facts relevant to the merits of the case
and the penalty in the event of conviction. The investigation should include
efforts to secure information in the possession of the prosecution and law
enforcement authorities. The duty to investigate exists regardless of the
accused’s admissions or statements to defense counsel of facts constituting guilt
123
or the accused’s stated desire to plead guilty.

The Supreme Court cited this standard to establish the defense counsel’s
incompetency in Rompilla v. Beard.124 Standard 14-3.2(b) of the ABA
Standards for Criminal Justice, Pleas of Guilty, discusses the
responsibilities of defense counsel in more detail, stating that “[d]efense
counsel should not recommend to a defendant acceptance of a plea unless
appropriate investigation and study of the case has been completed.”125
This standard was fashioned following Hill and has not been updated to
reflect the Court’s holdings in Lafler and Frye.126
B. Writing Requirements for Plea Offers
In Frye, the Court suggested that to prevent “late, frivolous, or
fabricated claims after a later, less advantageous plea offer has been
accepted or after a trial leading to conviction with resulting harsh
consequences,” states may require that “all offers must be in writing.” 127
The Court then cited the New Jersey Court Rule requiring that “any plea
offer” from the prosecution to the defense counsel be in writing. 128 Only
a small minority of states, however, currently requires plea agreements to
be in writing and signed by both parties.129 Other states have not enacted
a writing requirement, but have encouraged such a requirement through

123

Id. at 4-4.1(a).
545 U.S. 374 (2005).
125 See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PLEAS OF GUILTY, Standard 14-3.2 (3d
ed. 1997).
126 Batra, supra note 98, at 321–22.
127 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1408–09 (2012).
128 N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1(b) (2012) (“Any plea offer to be made by the prosecutor shall be in
writing and forwarded to the defendant’s attorney.”).
129 States with writing requirements include: Alaska, D. ALASKA R. 11.2; Arizona, ARIZ.
R. CRIM. P. 17.4(b); Indiana, IND. CODE ANN. § 35-35-3-3 (West); Kentucky, KY. CT. APP.
BOURBON SCOTT R. XXV; Nebraska, D. NEB. R. 12-4; New Jersey, N.J. CT. R. 3:9-1; New
Mexico, D. N.M. R. 6-502; North Carolina, N.C. SUP. CT. CUMBERLAND CNTY. R.;
Pennsylvania, PA. SUP. CT. CHESTER CNTY. R. 590.4; Tennessee, TENN. R. 20; Texas, D. TEX.
R. 5.28.
124
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their case law.130 In Alabama, for example, no writing requirement is
codified in the state statutes or court rules, but in Ex parte Cassady,131 the
Alabama Supreme Court explained:
The problem involved here could have been easily avoided had the plea
agreement been written and all the terms and conditions made a part of the
writing. If parties would reduce their plea agreements to writing, and present
them to the trial court prior to sentencing, rather than afterward, as was done here,
resolution of cases questioning the existence or contents of plea agreements
would be greatly facilitated. The record would also show whether or not the trial
132
court had accepted the plea agreement.

Thus, the Alabama Supreme Court is clear that written plea agreements
greatly facilitate the resolution of cases where the existence or the content
of a given plea agreement is at issue.
Memorializing plea agreements further allows courts to ensure that
plea agreements have a factual basis. For example, Oregon provides that
“[t]he court shall determine whether the plea is the result of prior plea
discussions and a plea agreement. If the plea is the result of a plea
agreement, the court shall determine the nature of the agreement.”133 It
would be difficult for a court to determine whether a plea is the result of
prior plea discussions, however, if there is no record of those prior plea
discussions.134 Interestingly, documentation of plea discussions is
required under Florida law when the defendant is pro se, requiring that
the prosecuting attorney “maintain the record of direct discussions with a
defendant who represents himself or herself and make the record
available to the trial judge upon the entry of a plea arising from these
discussions,” but not otherwise.135
130 See Congo v. State, 455 So. 2d 896 (Ala. 1984); Ex parte Swain, 527 So. 2d 1279
(Ala. 1988); Ex parte Cassady, 486 So. 2d 453 (Ala. 1986). See, e.g., the case notes following
ALA. R. CRIM. P. 14.3 (describing how the court in Ex Parte Yarber “noted that negotiated
plea agreements are not unenforceable merely because they are unwritten,” but in subsequent
cases, encouraged the use of written pleas).
131 Cassady, 486 So.2d 453.
132 Id. at 456.
133 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.390 (West); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A-1022
(West) (“By inquiring of the prosecutor and defense counsel and the defendant personally,
the judge must determine whether there were any prior plea discussions, whether the parties
have entered into any arrangement with respect to the plea and the terms thereof, and whether
any improper pressure was exerted in violation of G.S. 15A-1021(b).”).
134
Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Plea decisions are especially likely to seem inevitable
in hindsight because challenges depend on off-the-record evidence that is hard to prove.”).
135 FL. R. CRIM. P. 3.171.
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As various states that have adopted writing requirements for plea
discussions explain, formalization of the plea bargaining process would
help advance the goal of ensuring that plea offers have a factual basis, in
addition to ensuring that defendants are given a fair chance to prove an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim. This is especially necessary
given judicial disinclination to overturn a conviction, which is
exacerbated by the fact that most convicted defendants, in hindsight,
would naturally claim they would have accepted the guilty plea, and
judges are therefore likely to treat these claims skeptically. 136 Where an
offer lapses or is rejected, there is often no record of the plea offer, which
precludes the defendant from succeeding with an ineffective assistance
of counsel claim under Strickland.137
C. The Court’s Right to Reject a Plea
The trial court’s authority to reject a plea offer once the defendant
already accepted it is derived from the persuasive influence of Federal
Rule of Criminal Procedure 11.138 Although this rule affords trial courts
great liberty to reject a plea, “some reviewing courts require a trial court
to articulate on the record a sound reason for rejecting a plea.”139 Still, the
standard for appellate review does not serve as much of a check on trial
court discretion, as the appellate court can only reverse for an abuse of
discretion.140 Until the trial court accepts the plea agreement, the
agreement is not binding upon the parties.141
Every state has codified grounds upon which the trial judge may
reject a plea offer with the exception of South Carolina, which relies upon
case law to grant courts the authority to overrule plea agreements. 142
136 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“[J]udges are naturally skeptical and loath to overturn
convictions and sentences, particularly final ones. That judicial inclination, whether
conscious or unconscious, reinforces the difficulties of proving deficient performance and
prejudice under Strickland.”).
137 Bibas, supra note 11, at 162 (“Few defendants have documentary or other evidence
that their attorneys did not tell them of a plea offer or gave them incorrect advice.”).
138 FED. R. CRIM. P. 11(c).
139 1A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 180 (4th ed.
2013).
140 Id.
141
Id.
142 See ALA. R. CRIM. P. 11; ARIZ. R. CRIM. P. 17.2, 17.3, 17.5; ARK. R. CRIM. P. 24.3-24.6,
26.1; CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 1016.5, 1192.5 (West); COLO. R. CRIM. P. 11; CONN. GEN. STAT.
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These laws require trial judges to ensure that the defendant enters a plea
agreement voluntarily and knowingly, that there is a factual basis for the
plea offer, and that courts give due consideration to public interest and
effective administration of justice.143 The court may allow the defendant
to withdraw a plea offer in order to correct “manifest injustice” that would
otherwise occur.144
While these laws are helpful, more standardization is required. First,
clarification is necessary to show whether these are the only grounds
under which a trial court may reject a plea offer for the purposes of
determining whether a defendant’s later claim of ineffective assistance of
counsel should be entertained. Second, as noted earlier, requiring the
defense counsel and prosecution to memorialize their negotiations would
help the court determine if there was a factual basis for the plea.
D. The Prosecutor’s Right to Withdraw a Plea Offer Prior to
Entry of a Plea in Court
In Frye, the Supreme Court stated that under the second prong of
Strickland, the defendant must show “that the plea would have been
entered without the prosecution’s canceling it . . . if they had the authority
to exercise that discretion under state law.”145 As Justice Scalia
articulated, the majority fails to describe the specific grounds under
ANN. § 54-1j (West); D.C. SUPER. CT. R. CRIM. P. 11; DEL. R. CRIM. P. 11; FLA. R. CRIM. P.
3.170, 3.172; GA. UNIF. SUPER. CT. R. 33.7, 33.9, 33.12; HAW. R. PENAL P. 11; HAW. REV.
STAT. § 802E-2 (West); I.C.R. 11; ILL. S. CT. R. 402; IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-35-1-2, 35-35-13 (West); IOWA R. 2.8; KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22-3210; KY. R. CRIM. P. 8.08, 8.10; LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 29:145; LA. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 556, 559; ME. R. CRIM. P. 11; MD. R. 4-242;
MASS. R. CRIM. P. 12; MASS. MUN. CT. R. CRIM. P. 4; MASS. R. CRIM. P. 5; MICH. R. CRIM. P.
6.302, 6.310; MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.35 (West); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 32.1045
(West); MINN. R. CRIM. P. 15.01, 15.04-15.05; MISS. R. CRIM. P. 8.04; MO. SUP. CT. R. 24.02;
MONT. CODE ANN. §§ 46-12-20, 46-12-212, 46-16-105; NEB. CRIM. R. 11.2; D. NEV. CRIM. R.
4; D.N.H. R. 2.4; N.J. CT. R. 3:9-2; D.N.M. R. CRIM. P. 5-304; N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 15A1022 (West); N.D. R. CRIM. P. 11; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2937.07 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 22, § 517 (West); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 44, § 3270 (West); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. §§
135.335, 135.365, 135.385, 135.390, 135.395, 135.432 (West); PA. R. CRIM. P. 591; RI. R.
CRIM. P. 11; S.D. CODIFIED LAWS §§ 23A-7-3, 7-4, 7-5, 7-14, 27-11; TENN. R. CRIM. P. 11;
TEX. CRIM. PROC. CODE ANN. art. 26.13 (West); UTAH R. CRIM. P. 11; VT. R. CRIM. P. 11; VA.
SUP. CT. R. 7C:6; VA. CODE ANN. § 19.2-296 (West); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9.94A.431
(West); W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 11; W. VA. R. CRIM. P. 10; WIS. STAT. ANN. § 971.08 (West).
143
See supra note 142.
144 See id.
145 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, at 1403–04 (2012).
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which the prosecution may exercise this discretion. 146 In effect, the
prosecution has unregulated discretion to reject a plea offer, even without
a sound basis.147 The risk of prosecutorial abuse clearly establishes the
need for codifying a standard that sets forth the precise grounds giving
rise to the prosecutor’s authority to reject an accepted plea offer.
The ABA Standards for Criminal Justice state, “[a] prosecutor
should not fail to comply with a plea agreement, unless a defendant fails
to comply with a plea agreement or other extenuating circumstances are
present.”148 This standard should be expanded to require the prosecution
to explain under which circumstances it will subsequently reject a plea
offer after the defendant accepts it. If there is a committee of prosecuting
attorneys who discuss and render a decision as to whether or not to accept
a defendant’s plea offer, then this discussion should be recorded in
writing. The defendant can then ask for the record of plea discussions
during discovery in the event that the prosecution claims it would not
have accepted the plea offer even if the defendant accepted it.
Not only does the prosecution have wide discretion when choosing
to reject a plea offer, but as discussed earlier, plea bargaining is
characterized as a matter of “personal style” that gives the prosecution
the liberty to negotiate in any matter whatsoever. 149 Standards should
therefore be put in place to ensure that no unfair bargaining occurs, or in
other words, to ensure that the prosecution is fair and consistent with all
defendants when offering pleas.150 Oregon stands apart from other states
in codifying what is essentially a fair bargaining requirement, and
attempts to ensure that “[s]imilarly situated defendants [are] afforded
equal plea agreement opportunities.”151 Here, as elsewhere, the
movement by some states to codify requirements for the prosecution and
court in connection with plea bargaining indicates the need for such
formalization, and provides an example for other states to follow.

146

See supra note 74 and accompanying text.
Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S. Ct. 1473, 1486 (2010).
148 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUSTICE SCJ 3-4.2 (3d ed. 1993).
149 See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
150
See Bibas, supra note 11, at 164 (“[E]ven prosecutors have strong incentives to
promote and safeguard plea bargains.”).
151 OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 135.405 (West).
147
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V. CONCLUSION
In the absence of a formal plea bargaining process from the initial
stages of negotiation, Lafler and Frye provide a superficial right to
defendants, without a corresponding ability to exercise this right. A
formalized process may be an effective compromise between the
extremes of a “laissez-faire bargaining system” on one end and the
overregulation of plea bargaining by courts on the other.152 If the plea
bargaining process “is the criminal justice system,” as the Supreme Court
recognizes, and such reality justifies the right of defendants to challenge
a conviction on the basis of receiving ineffective assistance of counsel
during plea negotiations, then the process should be recorded and
standards should be in place to ensure that the process is fair.153
The Strickland requirements articulate what defendants must prove
in order to succeed on a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during
the plea bargaining process.154 Under the first prong, the defendant must
show that her defense counsel’s performance fell below the constitutional
minimum for competency.155 To prove incompetency, the defendant must
be able to present evidence from the record; however, in the majority of
states, neither prosecuting attorneys nor defense counsel are obligated to
create any record.156 Under the second prong of Strickland, the defendant
must demonstrate a reasonable probability that the defendant would have
accepted the plea absent defense counsel’s ineffective assistance, that the
prosecution would not have rejected the plea, and that the trial court
would not have rejected the plea.157 This is where the need for
formalization becomes most evident, as courts have stated that the
defendant cannot rely on her self-serving testimony, but must
demonstrate “objective evidence” to show that she would have accepted
the plea absent defense counsel’s error.158 Even if the defendant can prove

152 Bibas, supra note 11, at 152 (“In this laissez-faire bargaining system, defense lawyers,
not judges or juries, are the primary guarantors of fair bargains and equal treatment for their
clients.”).
153 Missouri v. Frye, 132 S. Ct. 1399, 1407 (2012) (quoting Robert E. Scott & William J.
Stuntz, Plea Bargaining as Contract, 101 YALE L.J. 1909, 1912 (1992)).
154 Id. at 1405.
155 Id. at 1409.
156
See supra note 129.
157 Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
158 See supra notes 102–03.
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this, she must still demonstrate that the prosecution and court would not
have rejected the plea offer.159 Both the prosecution and the court,
however, are granted broad discretion; there is no defined standard that
states the grounds under which the prosecution or the court can reject a
plea offer.160
To summarize, the plea bargaining process should be formalized in
the following ways: first, plea negotiations should be required to be in
writing; second, a standard should be codified, whereby prosecuting
attorneys have a duty to engage in equal and fair bargaining; third,
grounds under which prosecuting attorneys may reject a plea offer should
be codified; fourth, oral discussions among prosecuting committees in
deciding whether or not to accept a plea should be reduced to writing; and
fifth, whether the grounds under which a trial court may reject a plea
offer, as codified in state statutes and rules, are the same grounds courts
consider when determining whether to dismiss a defendant’s claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel should be clarified.
The first recommendation—to require written plea negotiations—is
the most important in light of the confusion that has emerged among trial
courts as to whether or not defense counsel must present a “formal offer”
to a defendant before a defendant can bring a claim of ineffective
assistance of counsel based on plea negotiations.161 Even after Lafler and
Frye, courts reached different conclusions on this issue, as some defined
a plea as “formal” even though it was not in writing.162 When defendants
must rely on objective evidence independent of self-serving testimony, a
writing requirement is necessary. Furthermore, such a requirement
would improve other aspects of plea bargaining, such as helping the court
determine whether there is a factual basis for a plea.163
Much of the discussion on the effect of Lafler and Frye naturally
focuses more on defense counsel, and the more stringent constitutional
duty created by these cases.164 Such discussion centers on ensuring that
159

Frye, 132 S. Ct. at 1409.
See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162.
161 See supra Part III (describing the trial court splits on this issue in more detail).
162 Wanatee v. Ault, 101 F. Supp. 2d 1189, 1202–03 (N.D. Iowa 2000), aff’d, 259 F.3d
700 (8th Cir. 2001).
163
See supra note 133 and accompanying text.
164 See, e.g., Jane Campbell Moriarty & Marisa Main, “Waiving” Goodbye to Rights:
Plea Bargaining and the Defense Dilemma of Competent Representations, 38 HASTINGS
160

SABRINA MIRZA.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2015]

11/3/2015 3:51 PM

FORMALIZING THE PLEA BARGANING PROCESS

513

defense counsel effectively represent their clients in plea bargaining
negotiations that occur off the record.165 Less has been said, however,
about how the extension of the Sixth Amendment right to effective
assistance of counsel to the plea bargaining process affects prosecuting
attorneys166 Including prosecutors in the process is, in many ways, crucial
to creating a just plea bargaining system.167 Without documenting plea
negotiations from the beginning, the potentially onerous burden is on the
prosecution during discovery to search through all of its records for
anything pertaining to plea negotiations. For the future, formalizing plea
negotiations thus eases the burden on both the prosecution and defense
counsel during litigation involving an ineffective assistance of counsel
claim.168 In our criminal justice system, where a majority of cases are
decided by plea bargains, the heaviest burden should not be on the
defendant to ensure that the system is fair.

CONST. L.Q. 1029, 1042 (2011) (discussing possible duties of defense counsel “to seek out
plea negotiations with the prosecution”).
165 See, e.g., Bibas, supra note 11, at 150.
166 See id. at 174 (“Prosecutors, too, can take steps to guard against the worst defense
lawyering, acting not just as partisan warriors but also has guardians of justice.”).
167 Ellen Yaroshefsky, Ethics and Plea Bargaining: What’s Discovery Got to Do With
It?,
23
Crim.
Just.
28,
33
(2008),
available
at
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publishing/criminal_justice_section_newslette
r/crimjust_cjmag_23_3_yaroshefsky.authcheckdam.pdf (proposing broader discovery and
“codification and expansion of the prosecutors’ obligations” to enhance “accountability and
transparency of the criminal justice system” in order to reduce wrongful convictions based on
guilty pleas).
168 See Bibas, supra note 11, at 162.
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